WEDNESDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 2026GLOBAL ECONOMICS INTELLIGENCE
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Market Structures Explained: From Perfect Competition to Monopoly

  • ▸Market structure, meaning how many firms compete and how easily new ones can enter, decides how far price rises above marginal cost and how much surplus society loses.
  • ▸In a worked example with demand P = 100 − Q and marginal cost 20, a monopolist sells half the competitive quantity at three times the price, and a quarter of the surplus a competitive market would create is lost.
  • ▸ONS data for 2025 show the five largest firms hold on average 66% of turnover in mining, energy and utilities but only 14% in construction; the turnover-weighted average has fallen since 2010, while the typical industry's concentration has not.
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Understanding market structures — simply put

A market structure describes the competitive setting a firm sells in: how many sellers there are, whether their products are identical or different, and how easily new firms can enter. Economists group markets into four types, from perfect competition, where no single firm can influence the price, to monopoly, where one firm sets it. The structure matters because it decides how high prices sit above the cost of producing one more unit, and so how much consumers pay and how much output the economy gives up.

How does it actually help?

Take a market where buyers' demand is P=100−QP = 100 - Q, so at a price of 60 they buy 40 units, and every unit costs 20 to make (marginal cost, MC=20MC = 20). Under perfect competition, rivals bid the price down to marginal cost: P=20P = 20 and Q=80Q = 80. A single seller instead chooses the output where the extra revenue from one more unit, marginal revenue MR=100−2QMR = 100 - 2Q, equals marginal cost: 100−2Q=20100 - 2Q = 20, so Q=40Q = 40 and P=60P = 60. The same buyers and the same costs give half the output at three times the price. The gap between price and marginal cost, measured by the Lerner index L=(P−MC)/PL = (P - MC)/P, rises from 0 to (60−20)/60=0.67(60 - 20)/60 = 0.67.

Why does this matter?

Competition authorities such as the UK's Competition and Markets Authority and the European Commission use these ideas to decide whether a merger can go ahead and whether a dominant firm is abusing its position. Regulators set prices for water supply and for energy and rail networks, because those networks tend toward a single supplier. For investors and managers, the structure of an industry predicts how much profit can last before entry competes it away.

What makes the classification reliable?

The four types are ideal cases. Real markets sit between them, and the right label depends on how the market is defined: "soft drinks" has many sellers, but "cola in UK supermarkets" has few. A reliable classification looks at the number and size of firms, how similar their products are, and the barriers to entry, and it defines the market by what buyers actually treat as substitutes.

The takeaway

How many firms there are, what they sell and whether others can join decide whether price is pushed to cost or held above it. The four types below, the tools to measure concentration, and the oligopoly models all follow from that.

The four market structures

FeaturePerfect competitionMonopolistic competitionOligopolyMonopoly
Number of sellersVery manyManyA fewOne
ProductIdenticalDifferentiatedIdentical or differentiatedUnique, no close substitute
Entry and exitFreeFreeRestrictedBlocked
Control over priceNone (price taker)SomeConsiderable, but depends on rivalsLarge
Long-run price vs marginal costP = MCP > MCP > MCP > MC
Long-run economic profitZeroZeroCan persistCan persist
Typical exampleWheat sold on a commodity exchangeRestaurants, hairdressersMobile networks, aircraft makersA regional water company
The four market structures compared

Perfect competition. Each firm is too small to affect the market price, so its demand curve is flat at the market price and P=MRP = MR. It produces where P=MCP = MC. If firms earn profits, new firms enter and push the price down until it equals minimum average cost, so long-run economic profit is zero. The outcome is efficient: every unit that buyers value above its cost is produced.

Monopoly. One firm faces the whole downward-sloping market demand curve, so selling one more unit means cutting the price on all units: MR<PMR < P. It produces where MR=MCMR = MC and charges the price buyers will pay for that quantity. Barriers to entry such as patents, control of a key input, legal licenses or large economies of scale stop rivals from competing the profit away.

Monopolistic competition. Many firms sell similar but differentiated products, so each faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its own variety. In the short run a firm can earn a profit, but entry of similar products shifts its demand left until price equals average cost. Price stays above marginal cost, and firms operate below the output that minimizes average cost, which is associated with Edward Chamberlin's analysis of excess capacity.

Oligopoly. A few firms dominate, and each one's best price or output depends on what the others do. That interdependence is what makes oligopoly different, and it is studied with game theory. The outcome depends on whether firms compete on quantity (the Cournot model), on price (the Bertrand model), or coordinate.

A hand-worked example

All numbers in this section are illustrative. Demand is P=100−QP = 100 - Q and every firm has a constant marginal cost of 20 and no fixed cost.

Step 1 — perfect competition. Price equals marginal cost: P=20P = 20, so Q=100−20=80Q = 100 - 20 = 80. Consumer surplus, the area between the demand curve and the price, is 12×80×(100−20)=3,200\tfrac{1}{2} \times 80 \times (100 - 20) = 3{,}200. Firms earn no profit.

Step 2 — monopoly. Total revenue is R=PQ=(100−Q)Q=100Q−Q2R = PQ = (100 - Q)Q = 100Q - Q^2, so marginal revenue is MR=dR/dQ=100−2QMR = dR/dQ = 100 - 2Q. Setting MR=MCMR = MC: 100−2Q=20100 - 2Q = 20, so Q=40Q = 40 and P=100−40=60P = 100 - 40 = 60.

  • Profit =(P−MC)×Q=(60−20)×40=1,600= (P - MC) \times Q = (60 - 20) \times 40 = 1{,}600.
  • Consumer surplus =12×40×(100−60)=800= \tfrac{1}{2} \times 40 \times (100 - 60) = 800.
  • Deadweight loss, the surplus from the 40 units that are no longer sold, =12×(80−40)×(60−20)=800= \tfrac{1}{2} \times (80 - 40) \times (60 - 20) = 800.

Check. Total surplus under competition is 3,200. Under monopoly it is 800+1,600=2,400800 + 1{,}600 = 2{,}400, and the 800 missing is exactly the deadweight loss: monopoly destroys 25% of the surplus a competitive market would create. Of the remaining 2,400, the monopolist takes 1,600 as profit. With any straight-line demand and constant marginal cost, the monopolist always sells half the competitive quantity and destroys a quarter of the surplus. The price ratio depends on the numbers: with demand P=a−QP = a - Q and cost cc, the monopoly price is (a+c)/2(a + c)/2, which is three times the competitive price here only because a=5ca = 5c.

Step 3 — markup and elasticity. Rewriting demand as Q=100−PQ = 100 - P gives dQ/dP=−1dQ/dP = -1, so at the monopoly point the price elasticity of demand is ε=(dQ/dP)(P/Q)=−1×60/40=−1.5\varepsilon = (dQ/dP)(P/Q) = -1 \times 60/40 = -1.5. The Lerner index is (60−20)/60=0.67(60 - 20)/60 = 0.67, which equals 1/∣ε∣=1/1.5=0.671/|\varepsilon| = 1/1.5 = 0.67. The monopolist's markup is set by how sensitive buyers are, as explained in elasticity.

Step 4 — Cournot duopoly. Now two identical firms each choose a quantity, q1q_1 and q2q_2, and the price is P=100−q1−q2P = 100 - q_1 - q_2. Firm 1's profit is (100−q1−q2−20)q1(100 - q_1 - q_2 - 20)q_1. Setting its derivative with respect to q1q_1 to zero gives its best response: 80−2q1−q2=080 - 2q_1 - q_2 = 0, or q1=40−q2/2q_1 = 40 - q_2/2. By symmetry q2=40−q1/2q_2 = 40 - q_1/2. Substitute the second into the first: q1=40−(40−q1/2)/2=20+q1/4q_1 = 40 - (40 - q_1/2)/2 = 20 + q_1/4, so 34q1=20\tfrac{3}{4}q_1 = 20 and q1=80/3≈26.7q_1 = 80/3 \approx 26.7; then q2=40−40/3=80/3q_2 = 40 - 40/3 = 80/3 as well. Total output is Q=160/3≈53.3Q = 160/3 \approx 53.3 and P=140/3≈46.7P = 140/3 \approx 46.7. Each firm earns (140/3−20)×80/3=6,400/9≈711(140/3 - 20) \times 80/3 = 6{,}400/9 \approx 711. Check: each firm's output is its best response to the other's, so neither wants to change it.

Step 5 — more firms. With nn identical Cournot firms, total output is Q=nn+1(100−20)Q = \tfrac{n}{n+1}(100 - 20):

Firms (n)Total outputPriceLerner index
1 (monopoly)40.060.00.67
253.346.70.57
360.040.00.50
566.733.30.40
1072.727.30.27
Competitive limit80.020.00.00
Cournot competition with n identical firms (P = 100 − Q, marginal cost 20)

Price falls toward marginal cost as firms are added, and the competitive outcome is the limit as nn grows.

Step 6 — Bertrand. If the two firms instead set prices for identical products, each can take the whole market by undercutting the other by a penny, so with identical products, equal constant costs, no capacity limits and buyers who all go to the cheapest seller, the only Nash equilibrium is P=MC=20P = MC = 20. Two firms are enough for the competitive price. The contrast with Cournot shows that the type of rivalry matters as much as the number of rivals.

Measuring concentration

Authorities cannot observe marginal cost directly, so they start with market shares.

Concentration ratio. CRkCR_k is the combined market share of the kk largest firms. With shares of 40%, 30%, 20% and 10%, CR2=70%CR_2 = 70\%.

Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). Square each firm's market share, measured in percentage points, and add them up:

HHI=∑i=1nsi2HHI = \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_i^2

where sis_i is firm ii's share in percent. For the four firms above, HHI=402+302+202+102=1,600+900+400+100=3,000HHI = 40^2 + 30^2 + 20^2 + 10^2 = 1{,}600 + 900 + 400 + 100 = 3{,}000. The index runs from close to 0 for many tiny firms to 10,000 for a monopoly (a 100% share squared). Four equal firms give 4×252=2,5004 \times 25^2 = 2{,}500, so the unequal market above is more concentrated than its number of firms suggests. The UK Competition and Markets Authority's State of UK Competition Report 2024 notes that competition agencies sometimes treat an HHI above 1,500 as moderately concentrated and above 2,500 as highly concentrated.

Mergers. If the third and fourth firms above merged, their shares would combine to 30%, and the HHI would rise to 402+302+302=3,40040^2 + 30^2 + 30^2 = 3{,}400, an increase of 400. The increase from merging firms with shares aa and bb is always 2ab2ab: here 2×20×10=4002 \times 20 \times 10 = 400. In UK merger control, the HHI is supporting evidence; jurisdiction depends on share-of-supply and turnover tests, and the decision rests on evidence about the merger's likely effects.

Worked example: concentration across UK industries

The Office for National Statistics publishes concentration measures for the UK's non-financial business economy, calculated from the turnover of firms in each four-digit industry and averaged across industries using turnover weights. Its bulletin of 13 October 2026 covers 2007 to 2025.

Mining, energy and utilities: 6666Mining, energ…Manufacturing: 5656ManufacturingBusiness and consumer services: 3636Business and …Education, health, arts and other services: 2525Education, he…Construction: 1414ConstructionNon-financial business economy (all): 3838Non-financial…
Broad industry groupAverage CR5, 2025 (%)Average CR5, 2010 (%)
Mining, energy and utilities6677
Manufacturing56about 55–57 over most of the period
Business and consumer services3644
Education, health, arts and other services2536
Construction14not reported
Non-financial business economy (all)3845
UK industry concentration: average five-firm concentration ratio by industry group — Source: ONS, Trends in UK industry concentration: 2007 to 2025 (13 October 2026).

How to read it. In mining, energy and utilities, the five largest firms hold on average about two-thirds of industry turnover (weighting each industry by its turnover), which points to oligopoly. In construction they hold about a seventh, closer to competitive or monopolistically competitive markets with many small builders. The ONS also reports that the turnover-weighted average HHI fell from 1,075 in 2010 to 700 in 2025, with the largest fall between 2014 and 2017. The simple average across industries tells a different story: the unweighted mean CR5 stayed at 0.47, so much of the weighted fall reflects turnover moving toward less concentrated industries rather than the typical industry becoming more competitive. The ratio and the index are summaries of the same turnover data, so their agreement is a consistency check, not independent confirmation.

Industry is not the same as market. These figures measure concentration within statistical industries across the whole UK. Competition authorities define markets by what buyers treat as substitutes and where they can buy: a national industry with low concentration can contain local markets dominated by one or two firms, and an industry can mix products that do not compete with each other. A regional water company is a monopoly in its area, yet the national utilities figure reads as an oligopoly. The ONS figures describe broad patterns, not whether any particular market is competitive.

The assumptions

Profit maximization. Firms choose output or price to maximize profit. Why it matters: the rules P=MCP = MC, MR=MCMR = MC and the Cournot best responses all come from this; a firm pursuing market share or managers' goals can produce more or less than the model predicts.

Known demand and costs. The firm knows the demand curve and its marginal cost. Why it matters: without this, the firm cannot find MR=MCMR = MC; in practice firms experiment and estimate, so actual prices may sit away from the theoretical optimum.

One price for all buyers. The monopolist charges every buyer the same price. Why it matters: with perfect price discrimination, charging every buyer their maximum willingness to pay, the firm sells the competitive quantity and the deadweight loss disappears, but it captures all the surplus; with prices that differ by group, total output and welfare can rise or fall.

The market is correctly defined. Shares and HHI refer to a market of genuine substitutes. Why it matters: defining the market too broadly makes concentration look low; too narrowly, and every brand looks like a monopoly.

Entry conditions are as stated. Long-run results depend on whether entry is free. Why it matters: a market with one firm but free entry and costless exit, with no sunk costs (a contestable market), can be held near average-cost pricing by the threat that rivals would enter, undercut and leave.

The formula

The general results are derived below; they are optional on a first reading.

Monopoly pricing. The monopolist maximizes π(Q)=P(Q)Q−C(Q)\pi(Q) = P(Q)Q - C(Q), where P(Q)P(Q) is inverse demand and C(Q)C(Q) total cost. The first-order condition is

P(Q)+Q P′(Q)=C′(Q),that is,MR=MC.P(Q) + Q\,P'(Q) = C'(Q), \quad\text{that is,}\quad MR = MC.

Dividing by PP and using ε=(dQ/dP)(P/Q)\varepsilon = (dQ/dP)(P/Q):

P−MCP=−Q P′(Q)P=1∣ε∣.\frac{P - MC}{P} = -\frac{Q\,P'(Q)}{P} = \frac{1}{|\varepsilon|}.

This is the inverse elasticity rule: the Lerner index equals one over the absolute price elasticity at the chosen point. Applied to the example: 1/1.5=0.671/1.5 = 0.67. It also shows a monopolist with non-negative marginal cost never produces where ∣ε∣<1|\varepsilon| < 1, because the Lerner index cannot then exceed 1. The second-order condition is MR′(Q)<MC′(Q)MR'(Q) < MC'(Q), which holds in the example because MR′=−2<0=MC′MR' = -2 < 0 = MC'.

Cournot with many firms. With linear demand P=a−bQP = a - bQ, constant marginal cost cc and Q=∑iqiQ = \sum_i q_i, firm ii maximizes (a−bQ−c)qi(a - bQ - c)q_i. The first-order condition is a−bQ−c−bqi=0a - bQ - c - bq_i = 0. In a symmetric equilibrium qi=Q/nq_i = Q/n, so

Q=nn+1⋅a−cb,P=a+ncn+1.Q = \frac{n}{n+1}\cdot\frac{a - c}{b}, \qquad P = \frac{a + nc}{n + 1}.

With a=100a = 100, b=1b = 1, c=20c = 20 and n=2n = 2: Q=23×80=53.3Q = \tfrac{2}{3} \times 80 = 53.3 and P=(100+40)/3=46.7P = (100 + 40)/3 = 46.7, matching Step 4. As n→∞n \to \infty, P→cP \to c.

Cournot markups and the HHI. In this subsection market shares are fractions, si=qi/Qs_i = q_i/Q, so the index runs from 0 to 1 (see the convention note below). For firms with possibly different costs, firm ii's first-order condition is P+P′(Q) qi=MCiP + P'(Q)\,q_i = MC_i. Rearranging, (P−MCi)/P=−P′(Q) qi/P=−P′(Q)QP⋅qiQ=si/∣ε∣(P - MC_i)/P = -P'(Q)\,q_i/P = -\tfrac{P'(Q)Q}{P}\cdot\tfrac{q_i}{Q} = s_i/|\varepsilon|. Weighting by shares and summing gives the industry's average Lerner index:

∑isiP−MCiP=∑isi2∣ε∣=HHI/10,000∣ε∣,\sum_i s_i\frac{P - MC_i}{P} = \frac{\sum_i s_i^2}{|\varepsilon|} = \frac{HHI/10{,}000}{|\varepsilon|},

where the last step converts back to the percent-based HHI.

This links the HHI to market power: in Cournot competition, a higher HHI means a higher average markup for given demand elasticity. Check with the duopoly: shares of 0.5 each give HHI/10,000=0.5HHI/10{,}000 = 0.5; the elasticity at P=46.7P = 46.7, Q=53.3Q = 53.3 is −46.7/53.3=−0.875-46.7/53.3 = -0.875, so the average Lerner index is 0.5/0.875=0.570.5/0.875 = 0.57, matching the table.

Convention. EconoLens writes market shares in percentage points inside the HHI (so a monopoly scores 10,000), as the CMA and ONS do. Some textbooks use fractions, so the index runs from 0 to 1; divide by 10,000 to convert.

When this isn't the right tool

  • Strategic behavior beyond one-shot quantity or price choice. Collusion, entry deterrence and repeated interaction need game theory.
  • Buyers or sellers with private information. Quality uncertainty and hidden costs change market outcomes; see information economics.
  • Effects that run across many markets. A tax or a shock in one industry can spill into input and labor markets; general equilibrium analysis handles these links.
  • Measuring market power from data. Shares and HHI are only screens. Estimating markups requires demand estimates and cost data, which use the methods in instrumental variables.
  • Welfare comparisons across structures. Deadweight loss is one measure; a full assessment weighs variety, innovation and fairness, as in welfare economics.

Practice problems

Problem 1. A monopolist faces demand P=120−2QP = 120 - 2Q and has constant marginal cost 40. Find its output, price and profit, the deadweight loss compared with perfect competition, and the Lerner index. Confirm that the Lerner index equals 1/∣ε∣1/|\varepsilon|.

Solution. Revenue R=120Q−2Q2R = 120Q - 2Q^2, so MR=120−4QMR = 120 - 4Q. Setting MR=40MR = 40: Q=20Q = 20, P=120−40=80P = 120 - 40 = 80. Profit =(80−40)×20=800= (80 - 40) \times 20 = 800. Under competition, P=40P = 40 and Q=40Q = 40, so the deadweight loss is 12×(40−20)×(80−40)=400\tfrac{1}{2} \times (40 - 20) \times (80 - 40) = 400. Lerner index =(80−40)/80=0.5= (80 - 40)/80 = 0.5. Elasticity at the monopoly point: dQ/dP=−1/2dQ/dP = -1/2, so ε=−0.5×80/20=−2\varepsilon = -0.5 \times 80/20 = -2 and 1/∣ε∣=0.51/|\varepsilon| = 0.5. Check: the two match.

Problem 2. A market has five firms with shares of 35%, 25%, 20%, 10% and 10%. Calculate the HHI. If the two smallest firms merge, what is the new HHI and the change? Using the concentration bands cited in the CMA's 2024 competition report, how would you describe the market before and after?

Solution. HHI=352+252+202+102+102=1,225+625+400+100+100=2,450HHI = 35^2 + 25^2 + 20^2 + 10^2 + 10^2 = 1{,}225 + 625 + 400 + 100 + 100 = 2{,}450. After the merger the shares are 35, 25, 20 and 20: HHI=1,225+625+400+400=2,650HHI = 1{,}225 + 625 + 400 + 400 = 2{,}650, an increase of 200. Check with the shortcut: 2×10×10=2002 \times 10 \times 10 = 200. The market moves from the moderately concentrated band (between 1,500 and 2,500) into the highly concentrated band (above 2,500). A competition authority would then look at evidence on how the merger is likely to affect prices.

Problem 3. At its profit-maximizing output, a firm with market power faces a price elasticity of demand of −4, and its marginal cost is 30. Using the inverse elasticity rule, what price maximizes profit? Why would a firm selling a product with many close substitutes charge a smaller markup?

Solution. The Lerner index is 1/4=0.251/4 = 0.25, so (P−30)/P=0.25(P - 30)/P = 0.25, which gives 0.75P=300.75P = 30 and P=40P = 40. Check: (40−30)/40=0.25(40 - 30)/40 = 0.25. Close substitutes make demand for the firm's own product more elastic, because buyers switch when it raises its price; a larger ∣ε∣|\varepsilon| means a smaller profit-maximizing markup.

Further reading

Sources

  • Office for National Statistics, Trends in UK industry concentration: 2007 to 2025, statistical bulletin, 13 October 2026 (CR5 by broad industry group; average CR5 and HHI for the non-financial business economy, 2010 and 2025; CMA HHI thresholds as cited). https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/business/activitysizeandlocation/bulletins/trendsinukindustryconcentration/2007to2025
  • Competition and Markets Authority, The State of UK Competition Report 2024 (concentration bands that competition agencies sometimes use). https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-state-of-uk-competition-report-2024
  • The demand, cost, market-share and elasticity numbers in the hand-worked example, the Cournot table and the practice problems are illustrative; all were computed by EconoLens.

Frequently Asked Questions

What are the four types of market structure?

The four types are perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly and monopoly. They differ in the number of sellers, whether products are identical or differentiated, and how easily new firms can enter. Perfect competition has many firms with no control over price; monopoly has a single seller that sets the price.

What is the difference between monopoly and oligopoly?

A monopoly has one seller with no close competitors, so it sets price without worrying about rivals' reactions. An oligopoly has a few large sellers whose decisions affect each other, so each firm's best price or output depends on what it expects its rivals to do.

How do you calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index?

Square each firm's market share expressed in percent and add the squares. A market with shares of 60, 25 and 15 percent has an HHI of 3,600 + 625 + 225 = 4,450. The index ranges from near zero for a market of many small firms to 10,000 for a monopoly.

What HHI level counts as a concentrated market?

A widely used rule of thumb, cited in the UK Competition and Markets Authority's 2024 State of UK Competition Report, treats an HHI above 1,500 as moderately concentrated and above 2,500 as highly concentrated. Authorities also look at how much a merger would raise the index and at direct evidence on prices.

Why does a monopoly cause a deadweight loss?

A monopolist restricts output to raise its price above marginal cost. Some buyers who value the good more than it costs to make are priced out, so mutually beneficial trades do not happen. The value of those lost trades is the deadweight loss.

Why do firms in monopolistic competition earn zero profit in the long run?

When existing firms earn profits, new firms enter with similar products and take away some of their customers. Each firm's demand falls until its price just covers average cost, so economic profit falls to zero, although price still stays above marginal cost.

What is the Lerner index?

The Lerner index measures market power as the gap between price and marginal cost relative to price: (P − MC)/P. It is zero under perfect competition and rises with market power. For a profit-maximizing monopolist it equals one divided by the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand.

Primary Sources

Cite This Article

EconoLens. (2026, November 16). Market Structures Explained: From Perfect Competition to Monopoly. EconoLens. https://www.econolens.co.in/news/study-market-structures-explained

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